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ABSTRACT 
The United States today is faced with a number of 
foreign policy challenges, the most pressing of wpich, 
in the view of the Reagan administration, is the 
containment of • communism. During the 1980s a strategy 
which emerged from the Vietnam war has been applied to 
meeting the communist threat -- low-intensity warfare 
(LIW). This strategy consists of low-level military 
involvement as well as economic and political pressure. 
The primary testing ground for this policy has been 
Central America where the administration has locked 
itself into a war with the 
government of Nicaragua. 
Communist Sandinista 
But does a low-intensity strategy fit in with the 
tradition and ideals of the United States? At present 
LIW serves the purpose of • removing a • sovereign 
'\ 
government but it has not been applied to an overall 
strategy regarding U.S. security interests. This 
appears to ·be the greatest detriment to a successful 
implementation of a low-intensity doctrine. There needs 
to be an understanding of the regions in which the U.S. 
is involved and this predicates a commitment to 
improving the quality of life as much as ensuring that a 
I 1 
I 
friendly government is in power. 
How then should the United States view 
low-intensity warfare? There is a place for developing 
a low-intensity policy for the U.S. but it needs to be 
tempered by an honest appraisal of American interests. 
If specific policy goals can be established and vital 
regions agreed upon, then a low-intensity doctrine can 
provide a workable defense for the United States. 
' 
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INTRODUCTION 
The establishment of ·rough nuclear parity with the 
Soviet Union has prompted a need for the reevaluation of 
the United states defense policy. Although Western 
Europe will continue to be the focal point of 
containment, the emergence of confrontation outside of 
this sphere dictates the need to provide for alternative 
forms of defense, especially in the Third World. The 
traditional modes of deterrence are no longer viable • 1n 
protecting U.S. strategic interests outside the European 
theatre, and, in order to deal successfully with these 
challenges, defense analysts and government officials 
are going to have to focus on alternative forms of 
warfare. The most popular of these alternatives • 1S 
known as low-intensity conflict (LIC) or low-intensity 
warfare (LIW). This form of warfare can range in 
intensity from small, brushfire wars fought by proxies, 
to the seemingly innocuous use of propaganda to further 
a state's foreign policy. The more serious forms of 
this type of conflict have grown in use through the 
' 1980s and it appears that this trend will continue to / 
the end of the century. 
3 
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If it is true that the primary source of conflict 
to be faced by the United States in the coming years is 
to be of the low-intensity nature then several questions 
regarding the terms of this type of war, as well as 
American preparedness to fight under such conditions, 
should be answered. In addition there is the need for 
an honest appraisal of what actions demand an American 
response. A response that will be beneficial for the 
United States is possible only within a well thought-out 
strategic framework. Without specific plans as to what 
areas are essential to U.S. security, America will find 
itself overcommitted and unable to protect interests 
which are actually vital. 
In order for the United States to formulate a suc-
cessful low-intensity strategy it is neccessary for the 
public to have an understanding of what LIW is and how 
it will be applied. This paper will outline the current 
LIW definitions as well as its applications in the past 
and present. The success of these strategies will be 
discussed in regard to overall U.S. foreign policy. 
Finally an opinion will be offered as to how the United 
States can develop a beneficial LIW strategy, and if, in 
r fact, this type of doctrine is at all suitable for the 
needs and aims of American foreign policy. 
4 
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I. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: DEFINITIONS and APPLICTIONS 
The problems that LIC raises are unfamiliar ones 
' because they are questions that are essential in 
deciding to what extent America will become involved in 
low-intensity warfare. On a basic level the United 
States sees LIC as a way to protect what it considers 
its vital interests, especially in Central America. 
This policy cannot be carried out without foresight by 
the government. Most important is the need to establish 
legitimate security concerns. The United States policy-
makers look to LIC as a way to maintain control ,ver the 
Western Hemisphere but this has been done without a 
realistic debate as to what threats actually exist • in 
Central America. The current administration bases its 
policy of intervention in Nicaragua on its belief that a 
popular Communist government there will make the 
extension of communism its primary goal throughout the 
rest of the • region. Given this fear the Reagan 
administration has made pursuit of a low-intensity war 
in Central America a priority in its foreign policy. 
The argument for this policy has been defensive, a war 
against communism for the protection of freedom. This 
presentation of U.S. involvement, however, is too 
simplistic and not entirely accurate. 
5 
Is low-intensity warfare to be used solely as a 
defensive policy or can it be used offensively as jell? 
In the view of the Reagan administration it can serve 
both functions equally well, as demonstrated in both El 
Salvador and Nicaragua. In El Salvador LIC is used as 
"protection from communist aggression" while in 
Nicaragua it is being used to try and overthrow a 
Communist government already in power. As Edward 
Luttwak says the main reason for peace in the world 
today is because the United States has helped nations to 
resist aggression and has stood as the guarantor of 
international self-determination. 1 This belief is 
probably supported by the majority of Americans; we see 
ourselves as the protectors of freedom in the world. 
But is a policy that actively seeks the overthrow of a 
foreign government, simply because it is communist, as 
widely supported? It would appear that such action, 
rather than championing self-determination would seek to 
destroy it. For the United States to become involved 
in such a conflict it is necessary to have the I aims 
clearly presented so a policy that is compatible with 
America's moral and 
fashioned. 
political tradition can be 
In spite of the rhetoric that has accompanied all 
•• 
administrations since the Second World War, the United 
States • 1S not altruisticly committed to wars of 
6 
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self-determination. Rather, there has been a shift in 
support for revolutions as the U.S. has become a status 
• quo power. With the emergence of the Soviet Union as 
the only legitimate rival of the United States there 
came a restructuring of goals in • American foreign 
policy. Although support was professed for states that 
were involved in revolutions, this support was really 
only for nations whose revolutionary doctrines reflected 
the same ideology as the U.S .. In effect the line was 
drawn between those countries sympathetic to the 
American • view of democracy and those which advocated a 
socialist form of government. Contrary to U.S. wishes 
however the majority of revolutions centered around a 
shift toward a communist form of government. The 
prevalent I view toward communism held by U.S. officials 
was that it was monolithic, controlled by the Soviet 
Union. Although this belief was incorrect, it led to a 
more pessimistic I view of revolutions by the United 
States which now saw revolutionary action, especially in 
the Third World, as a threat to American security. 
This perception of revolutions I in Africa, 
Indochina, and Central America resulted in a move by the 
U.S. away from advancing the democratic process towards 
protecting U.S. interests. This shift in policy became 
more apparent as the Cold War hardened, with both sides 
trying to align support throughout the world. For the 
7 
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United states it meant the continuation of a policy that 
had been practiced, but not publicly acknowledged, since 
the early lSOO's. Despite declarations to the contrary 
the U.S. was actively seeking to control Third World 
nations that it befriended. Although this had been 
accepted policy in the previous century in dealing with 
Central America, this action was now carried out across 
the globe. The question then arises: do the American 
people support a policy that is a contradiction of their 
own beliefs and definition of freedom? Is the United 
States interested only in its own goals and security and 
is low-intensity warfare being applied strictly to 
achieve a more secure United States at the expense of 
other Third World nations? It is hoped that this is not 
the case but the implementation of LIC under President 
Reagan to assure American credibility and prosperity 
seems to be just that. The president himself asserts 
that: 
The national .~ecuri ty of all the Americas is 
at stake in Central America. If we cannot de-
fend ourselves [sic] there, we cannot expect 
to prevail elsewhere. Our crediblity would 
collapse, our alliances would crumble and the 
safety ~f our homeland would be put at 
jeopardy. 
There is a need for the American people to 
understand not only the aims of the administration but 
· the aims of LIC as well. For the public to support or 
8 
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reject the use of low-intensity warfare to further what 
have been stated as the foreign policy goals of the 
United States, it is neccessary that the nature of LIC, 
as well as how it impacts traditional American ideals, 
is explained. 
To begin, the variety of definitions, both for and 
against, regarding low-intensity war need to be given. A 
singular explanation of low-intensity conflict is almost 
impossible, given the wide range of uses that LIC serves 
throughout the world today. It is currently being used 
by both insurgent and counter-insurgent forces and it is 
applied through political, economic, and military means. 
Not only does a popular definition escape international 
agreement, but also is there a lack of consensus within 
the United states as to what exactly low-intensity war 
is, how it should be used to further American foreign 
policy, and, even,if it should be used at all. In order 
to • gain a better understanding of low-intensity war it 
is first neccessary to put LIC into perspective 
regarding other forms of conflict, and then to offer 
some current definitions. 
Levels of Conflict 
Since 1945 the number of different kinds of war has 
tripled, and traditional methods of warfare have taken 
r 9 ' ! 
on some additional characteristics. Before the Second 
World War there were two primary kinds of conflict. 
Today there are six which are as follows: 
The kinds 
*Armed peace. 
*Low-intensity conflict. 
*Limited war. 
*General conventional war (which may 
include the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons and/or chemical weapons). 
*Theatre nuclear war. 
*Global nuclear war. 3 
of conflict that pre-war military 
strategists were concerned with were limited war and 
general conventional war. In fact, conventional war was 
seen as the primary area in which military force would 
be used, not only by the United States but by all the 
European powers. The definition of conventional war 
would probably be the most common definition of war 
itself: a large-scale conflict with full mobilization, 
fought between two adversaries for nationalistic 
reasons. This type of war had predominated for the past 
two centuries and both of the World Wars had centered 
around full-scale mobilization and fighting, with 
certain restraints being observed by both sides. 
Conventional war planning was the doctrine of military 
professionals and became, for the United States, what 
I' 
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Andrew Krepinevich calls the Army Concept. He says that 
this concept developed over a long period of traditional 
war tactics and is now firmly based in the army's 
4 psyche. 
The other kind of conflict that had some use 
before 1945 was limited war. This kind of war served 
primarily to keep colonial possesions in line without 
fully involving the military or civilian population. 
This form of war is at times more difficult to control 
because limited war is) a matter of perspective. As 
Captain Ralph Peters states: 
For at least one of the parties, it is a war for political goals rather than for national survival, and this generally results in a rit-
ualization of the war, with complex 
:estr!ctions on targeting and military object-ives. 
In other words, a limited war could be fought in a more 
detached way than could a conventional war, at least for 
one of the participants. 
Following the Second World War these kinds of 
conflict became a secondary concern as the use of 
nuclear weapons to wage war became a much more 
threatening reality. Coupled with this was the 
omnipresent situation of armed peace between the Soviet 
. Union and the United States and the developing trend • 1n 
the 1950 1 s towards what the soviets termed "wars of 
11 
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national liberation", insurgencies in the Third World. 
These types of conflicts were not provided for in the 
Army Concept and as a result the United States was 
unprepared for the new challenges it faced. 
The concepts of theatre nuclear war and global 
nuclear war are quite self-explanatory and did not 
become a realistic war threat until the late 1940 1 s when 
the Soviets detonated their first atomic bomb. Both the 
theatre and global nuclear concepts evolved from this, 
leading to doctrines such as Mutual Assured Destruction 
(MAD) and Massive Retaliation. In these concepts of war 
traditional means of combat were rendered ineffective, 
and planning for a nuclear war, either ' in a specific 
area or world-wide, became the focus for U.S. military 
strategy. Although conventional forces continued to be 
deployed in Western Europe as a deterrent to Soviet 
aggression, it became increasingly obvious that it was 
really the nuclear threat that maintained the status quo 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 
Not only did the nuclear standoff become a reality 
for the world after 1945 but so did the concept of armed 
peace. Peters describes the objective of armed peace 
as: 
••. extended control and power consolidation. 
Each side strives to appear so formidable that 
the opponent is not only deterred from a 
direct military response but is also reluctant 
to interfere in state operations involving 
. i 12 
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third parties. The art 
the opponent into so 
sees no 6alternative to gamble. 
lies in not backing 
tight a corner that he 
a desperate military 
This type of war (or lack thereof) has been in place 
since the end of the Second World War when the U.S. and 
Soviet Union emerged as the preeminent powers. It 
became evident through the 1950's that armed peace was 
to be the primary conflict that the superpowers would 
fight. A conventional war would, in all likelihood, 
escalate to a nuclear confrontation, as could a limited 
war. Out of necesity, then, the Americans and Russians 
had to continue to arm themselves and attempt to gain 
control, or at least the support of, other states. It 
was this competition in armed peace which led to the 
development of the 
low-intensity conflict. 
variety of Definitions 
-
most useful kind of war: 
Unlike the other forms of war discussed above, 
there is no hard and fast definition of low-intensity 
conflict. Like limited war it is defined according to 
perspective; a low-intensity war for one state may be a 
mid- or high-intensity conflict for another. Unlike 
other forms of warfare however, it must be fought with a 
.. greater degree of foresight and with the realization 
13 
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that the use of military force may be the least 
effective strategy. What then is low-intensity warfare, 
and how is it to be defined? 
In spite of the increasing number of articles that 
deal with LIC, a widely accepted definition dealing with 
both the political and military ramifications of this 
form of warfare has yet to be published. At present the 
definition found in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet, US Army Operational Concept 
for Low-Intensity Conflict, gives a strict military view 
and is defined as: 
... a limited politico-military struggle to 
achieve political, social, economic or psycho-
logical objectives. It is often protracted 
and ranges from diplomatic economic, and 
psycho-social pressures through terrorism and 
insurgency. It is generally confined to a 
geographic area and is often characterized by 
constraints on t9e weaponry, tactics, and 
level of violence. 
It is obvious from this definition that the Army view of 
LIC is quite broad and encompasses many options, but 
focuses on the use of military force to deal with 
low-level warfare. Another definition is provided by 
Robert Kupperman and William Taylor, Jr., who • recognize 
that low-intensity conflict does not neccessitate 
military action. Their concept of LIC is ''any conflict 
between states and/or coherent political, economic, or 
ethnic groups that falls short of large unit engagement 
14 
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on a battlefield. 
This is 
Violence is implied but not 
probably a more acceptable essential'' . 8 
definition of low-intensity warfare because it 
recognizes the need to understand LIC as a broader 
concept. 
A non-military definition regarding LIC is 
important because it reflects a different view than the 
traditional belief that war is only a military con-
frontation. A low-intensity concept, however, sees war 
a~ primarily a political confrontation. Rather than the 
conflict being between two armies, it is instead between 
two political systems. Since 1945 this political 
struggle has been between democracy and communism and 
for American proponents of LIC it has provided the means 
to challenge the soviets in the Third World. 
The lack of consensus regarding LIC is evidenced by 
the variety of definitions being offered in addition to 
those offered by the military. This includes . the 
defiii,ition offered by the political left wing in Michael 
Klara's article in The Nation: "(LIC) contains both a 
strategic blueprint for military activities abroad and a 
political program for manipulating public opinion at 
home. 119 as well as the view from the right, which sees 
LIC as the greatest hope in the fight against communism 
in the Third World. At the same time, however, 
low-intensity warfare is also seen as a threat to the 
.l, 
I -y 
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United States because it is used by insurgents to 
exploit the weaknesses of the U.S. Thus LIC can be 
defined as being both an offensive as well as a 
defensive strategy, with a number of options available 
to pursue certain goals. As George Schultz said: 
"(low-intensity war) is a matrix of different kinds of 
challenges, varying in scope and scale. If they have a 
single feature in common, it is their ambiguity. 1110 
This is the common thread that runs through all attempts 
at defining LIC: the ability to use this warfare to 
accomplish almost any goals. 
What low-intensity war involves, then, is political 
and economic pressure that relies on the use of military 
force only as a last alternative. The primary objective 
of LIC is to win the war by winning the hearts and minds 
of the people rather than by controlling territory, 
which is the traditional military strategy. This kind 
of war predicates a completely different involvement by 
both the military and the civilian population. Strict 
adherence to traditional military strategies tends to 
deter rather than benefit a country enmeshed in a 
low-intensity struggle because more troops and greater 
firepower miss the central issue: that of insinuating 
oneself into the fabric of the society and bringing 
change from within rather than forcing it militarily 
from without. 
•• 
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As a result the involvement of the U.S. takes on a 
new shape in low-intensity warfare. Rather than using 
its greater military strength to overwhelm the enemy the 
focus is instead on the population. The use of LIC 
does not lend itself to a quick or "surgical'' war but is 
instead a long-term commitment to economic, political, 
and social action. The involvement by both military and 
civilian groups in LIC will, in the best of 
circumstances, make actual combat activity uneccessary 
and will provide a more positive image for the United 
States both abroad and at home. However, as has been 
demonstrated in the past, Americans, especially the 
Armed Forces, have been reticent to accept a form of war 
that does not involve the optimum use of their military 
resources. Low-intensity war reflects problems raised 
in analyzing American involvement in this type of 
conflict because of its untraditional strategies. 
Low-intensity warfare also necessitates a long-term 
commitment because it involves interaction with the pop-
ulation of the enemy. Rather than a quick military fix 
LIC requires working within a society to try and win the 
'' indigenous personnel" over to your side. A war of 
''hearts and minds" is not won in six months or a year; 
it takes time as.well as economic and political support 
and it is exactly this kind civilian/military 
: I, 
involvement with which • Americans are unfamiliar. As 
17 
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Captain Ralph Peters says: 
... we are at our greatest disadvantage when we become directly involved in LIC. Faced with an incipient LIC situation, we almost invaria-bly prove11 politically and militarily indecisive. 
This type of long-term commitment is difficult for 
the U.S. to make because of changes in administration as 
well as public influence. Foreign policy goals as well 
as public support for these goals can change as often as 
every four years, making a consistent long-term 
commitment virtually impossible. Even within a 
presidential term campaign promises and budget requests 
can limit American success in low-intensity warfare. The 
role that the United States decides to play in internat-
ional affairs is shaped then by what the American people 
and government are willing to accept as their goals. 
I Terrorism 
.. 
Although this paper will focus primarily on the use 
of low-intensity conflict to fight insurgent and 
counterinsurgent wars, there is another aspect of LIC 
that most I Americans consider a mu.ch more dangerous 
threat: terrorism. Although this does not fit in with 
the way that LIC has been presented above,it nonetheless 
is a form of low-intensity warfare and has gained the 
18 
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greatest public exposure in the last tew years. Unlike 
the guerilla wars in which LIC is used, terrorism is 
even more nebulous in terms of definition and reaction. 
Although a low-intensity war is often undeclared, at 
least the enemy is somewhat visible and the grounds for 
fighting, if not traditional, are accepted by both 
sides. 
In terrorism, however, it is difficult to retaliate 
because there is a lack of an adequate defense, as well 
as little knowledge as to why or when attacks will 
occur. In addition, the civilian population • 1S 
manipulated in a much more violent and unpredictable 
way. As in fighting wars of counterinsurgency the 
tradition of the American system makes any consistent 
response to terrorism difficult. There is a moral 
problem in responding in kind to an attack which kills 
or injures civilians solely for the purpose of elicting 
a response from the United States. A military solution 
cannot be applied with any consistency, and this limits 
the way in which the U.S. can react. Because the 
terrorism • issue • 1S an emotional one, given to 
overreaction and the desire to strike out quickly • 1n 
retaliation. This kind of action needs to be replaced 
by a policy which would serve the defensive needs of the 
U.S. in protecting its citizens against 
attacks. 
19 
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Mr. Kupperman and Mr. Taylor give two reasons 
why the United States cannot afford to react blindly. 
First is the fact that we may fail in our attempt to 
punish the perpetrators. Second, if the U.S. succeeds 
too well it runs the risk of granting the terrorists 
their real objective by overreacting and subverting its 
own . . l 12 pr1nc1p es. Both of these warnings are 
well-founded and should help in directing American use 
of LIC to combat terrorism. 
The first caution is important in that the U.S. is 
not used to failure, especially in dealing with smaller 
states. This is true not only of terrorism but of 
guerilla wars as well. In order to be successful • 1n 
combatting terrorism, the government must be sure that 
its retaliation will be effective in stopping future 
attacks. If this doesn't occur the terrorists will feel 
free to continue their "war" with little fear that the 
U.S. can curb their actions. In addition, for the 
United States to maintain its support among its allies, 
.·> 
as well as its position of power, it is important that 
any military action taken against terrorists be 
successful. 
The second point is also well made regarding 
counterinsurgency as well as terrorism. If the United 
States has to compromise its own principles in order to 
fight a low-intensity war it may well not be worth the 
I 
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sacrifice. T~e moral stance of America is as important 
as punishing terrorists, and overreaction can lead to 
strikes that are not only ineffective but counterproduc-
tive. The United States cannot maintain an air of moral 
superiority if it is committing the same crimes, albeit 
on a defensive basis. The public needs to be especially 
alert to this danger because it is often their will 
which can affect an administration policy. 
As in wars of counterinsurgency, foresight is 
essential in dealing with terrorism. A lack of this is 
. evident in the Reagan administration's policies 
regarding terrorism. The president's desire to have the 
United States ''standing tall" has led to a policy of 
military action against terrorists. Rather than 
focusing on revenge, the administration should instead 
be working to understand the sources of terrorism and 
how they can be eradicated. This will take the 
cooperation of our allies as well as a strong measure of 
self-restraint. The bombing of Libya has provided a 
short-term solution, but it does not guarantee long-term 
success. The United States is vulnerable to terrorism, 
both politically and technologically, given the nature 
of our society. But the U.S. can neither isolate itself 
from the world, nor become involved in a series of 
state-sponsored attacks and counter-attacks. It is too 
simplistic a view to see the military answer as the only 
' ' ,, 
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viable one. These concerns must be thought through in 
directing a low-intensity war on terrorism. The problem 
should not be ignored but neither should it be treated 
with an eye-for-an-eye mentality. The United States has 
too much to lose, and too little to gain. 
22 
II. LIC, the Army and Vietnam 
As stated above, the Army Concept takes a rather 
narrow approach to military strategy, and its basis in 
the tradition of conventional war leaves little room for 
the new concept of low-intensity conflict. The 
prevailing belief within Army circles is that Western 
Europe, not Central America, will be the major area of 
confrontation with the Soviets, who are seen as the 
primary threat to American security. In fact, the Army 
believes that a strong conventional military force 
focused on deterrence in Europe will serve as an 
effective deterrence everywhere. This belief precludes 
the need for special forces as far as the military is 
concerned. However, as Eliot Cohen suggests, this • 1S 
not the case. He states that "inevitably, the United 
States will fight small wars, and hence ought to 
allocate a large proportion of its military resources to 
preparing to cope with them 11 • 13 He continues to say 
that, rather than decreasing, American commitments to 
maintaining the status quo have increased since the days 
of containment in the 1950's and, as a result, the U.S. 
\ 
needs to focus on the low-intensity war problem. f 
Although there had been an increased interest 
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in the development of a counter-insurgency force with 
the election of the Kennedy administration in 1960, the 
idea of a special force was not widely accepted by the 
r, 
A%my. Kennedy's idea of a counter-insurgency force was 
a reaction to Nikita Khrushchev's support for wars of 
national liberation, and it fit in well with the 
administration's new policy of flexible response. In 
spite of this move away from strict nuclear reaction, 
the defense establishment was still focused on conflict 
in Europe and the ''implicit assumption that 
'low-intensity' warfare [was] merely a lesser-included 
case of •real' war", the kind that would be fought • 1n 
14 Europe but had not been fought for over 30 years. The 
belief in the unquestioned ability of the United States 
to prevail with traditional conventional forces • in any 
conflict continued to be held by the military, despite 
the prodding of the Kennedy administration. This 
attitude was reflected by General Maxwell Taylor, Army 
Chief of Staff from 1955 to 1959 and President Kennedy's 
Special Military Representative in charge of monitoring 
the counterinsurgency program, when he said:"We good 
soldiers are trained for all kinds of things. We don't 
have to worry about special situations. 1115 
The formation of a Special Operations Force 
(SOF) also ran into problems because of a suspicion of 
elite forces within the military The type of operations 
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that this force would be used for had traditionally been 
carried out by the Marines, and the development of a 
special force was seen as a threat by all branches of 
the • service. This failure to support SOF is evident 
even today, in spite of Congressional pressure to 
improve American counterinsurgency forces. As stated in 
U.S. News and World Report, delays in developing these 
forces ''could fairly be attributed to the attitude 
regarding SOF [that is] prevalent in the Defense 
Department. 1116 Not only is there a reluctance to improve 
SOF because of suspicions within the service but also 
because of funding. One high military official was 
quoted as saying: "The people at the top are obsessed 
with new missles, high-tech weapons and other big-ticket 
items, not low-budget, high-risk and high return things 
like SOF. 1117 
With the primary focus still on the Soviets in 
Europe, low-intensity warfare has not yet altered the 
Army Concept. The • pervasive belief that the major 
threat remains in the European theatre has hindered the 
ability to construct a realistic strategy to deal with 
LIC in the Third World. As a result there has been very 
little specificity in training, either militarily or 
politically. There has been some training with the 
Army's Department of civil Affairs (CA) whose • primary 
objective is the population, known as ''indigenous 
" 
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personnel'' , and whose 
f , 18 causes o insurgency. 
approach is to eliminate the 
Unlike the regular Army forces, 
CA forces approach their involvement with the long-term 
,,,.. in mind. They work to support unconventional warfare 
operations through the use of foreign internal defense 
(FID) and by recognizing the need to understand the 
society. Civil Affairs forces operate under the 
assumption that there is no "quick fix" in dealing with 
low-intensity warfare. This however is one small segment 
of the Army, and for the military to develop a 
successful low-intensity doctrine this type of training 
will have to become the rule rather than the exception. 
How has the Army's lack of preparation affected 
the United State's ability to fight a low-intensity war • 
in the Third World? From the outset it must be 
understood that participation in this kind of conflict 
does not only involve the military but also the media, 
with its influence on public perception, as well as the 
Washington bureaucracy. For an administration to wage a 
successful low-intensity war it needs the support of all 
three of these groups, a particularly difficult task, as 
evidenced by • American participation • 1n the Vietnam 
conflict, the United States' first involvement 
low-intensity warfare. 
• in 
From the outset the conflict in Vietnam was 
misunderstood by both the military and the executive 
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branch. The Pentagon was commited to fighting a 
traditional war in Southeast Asia in spite of 
recognition by the Kennedy administration that success 
depended on a new and more effective strategy. Counter-
insurgency, advocated by President Kennedy and his 
Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, was seen as "all 
this cloud of dust'' by the Joint Chiefs of Staff who 
faulted the administration for "ignoring time-vindicated 
principles of military strategy11 • 19 The failure of the 
president to change this attitude resulted in an 
escalation of the war on a conventional basis. 
This conventional war was based on a policy of 
attrition. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 
. 
(MACV) relied on the belief that superior firepower 
would overwhelm the North Vietnamese forces and 
eventually wear them down by inflicting unacceptably 
high casualties. This policy was seen as the best 
possible option for American victory because of the 
refusal of the government to allow an invasion of the 
North. The use of massive firepower had been successful 
in both Korea and in World War II and U.S. military 
leaders believed that this strategy offered them the 
prospect of I I w1nn1ng the war more quickly than did 
reliance on counterinsurgency operations, which they 
viewed as too long and drawn out. 20 Thus the war in 
Vietnam was fought with a strategy of 
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attrition, 
although some believe that in reality this merely 
reflected the lack of a better policy. 
By the mid-1970's it became apparent that this 
strategy was not effective in either wearing down the 
enemy or winning the war. There had been some 
experimentation with low-intensity strategies by the 
Marines as documented by military historian John Hoyt 
Williams: 
While Army and Saigon command continued to be 
obsessed with the numbers game, search-and-de-
stroy missions, bombing and large-unit sweeps, 
the Marines kept stubbornly experimenting with local, small-unit tactics ... they lived in the hamlets, cooperated with the peasants, offered free medical and dental services, helped build 
schools and created a grassroots gendarmerie. In return the villagers were to supply intelligence and finger vc cadre in their 
midst. The Marine operations were successful because they de-escalated the war and guerrilla'd the guerrillas ... recognizing that 
the Vietnamese peasant, rather than ~~e Viet Cong, was the genuine goal of the war. 
With the failure of conventional warfare and the 
loss of the war then there came a realization, at least 
for some in the Pentagon, that a policy of low-intensity 
warfare would have to be adopted if the United States 
was to have any success in the Third World. As a result 
there emerged from Vietnam two schools of thought 
regarding strategic doctrine: the war school and the 
insurgengy school. In spite of tbe lessons that could 
I 
have been learne~ from the Vietnam war the "Army was not 
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in a position to answer even basic questions with regard 
to tactics, operations or strategy in this kind of 
conflict11 • 22 The thinking of the Army in Vietnam was 
primarily in traditional terms, following the Army 
Concept and using military resources on a scale more 
akin to total war. The results were not only 
ineffective but counterproductive. The emergence of the 
insurgency school recognized the need for population 
security and pacification and the need to address the 
political problems. This differed from the war school's 
goal of controlling territory and defeating the enemy. 
The war school believed as well that the war had 
not been a traditional revolution: 
[While Vietnam] had a number of peculiarities, 
it was not the kind of revolutionary war that 
most U.S. policymakers thought ... the war was 
not only directed from North Vietnam but was 
fought and eventually23won by soldiers in a 
conventional offensive. 
This • view predominated following the war, 
especially among military professionals. The belief 
that the Army could have won the war, given the proper 
support from the government, is reflected in the 
statements made by officers who felt that the Army was 
''not allowed to fight" and that the policymakers had 
really lost the war. The lack of success of 
conventional warfare had done little to dissuade the 
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proponents of strength through superior firepower. 
The insurgency school however had quite a different 
perception of the Vietnam conflict: 
••• the war [had] always remained basically an insurgency, boosted by infiltration and 
aided ... by both invasions and raids ... In an insurgency, the military dimension is not likely to be decisive; more important are the 
economic, political a2i pyschological dimensions of the conflict. 
Whether the insurgency school was correct in its 
assesment of the war has yet to be decided. What was 
decided, though, was the fact that low-intensity warfare 
played some part in the Vietnam conflict, and American 
refusal to deal with this cost the United States the 
war. This realization also led to some agreement within 
the military, and on the Right, a need to develop some 
policy regarding LIC. As a result the following basic 
arguments about strategy emerged from the Vietnam war: 
1. Pacification, or the "hearts and minds" 
approach, correctly targets population, not territory, 
as the strategic objective. 
2. Military escalation is often counterproductive; 
overkill can win battles but lose wars. As former Viet-
namese Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky admitted bitterly, ''You 
cannot use a steamroller against a shadow. '' 
3. Counterinsurgency fails where it does not take 
indigenous culture and history into account; successful 
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operations need solid intelligence about local 
political, cultural, social and economic conditions. 
4. Counterrevolution can only succeed if it is 
combined with "nation-building'' - the construction of an 
alternative social system. Nation-building combines 
''internal defense'' (protection against insurgents) with 
economic assistance, in order to create a strong secur-
ity apparatus, a manageable political community and 
stable national institutions. 
5. The United States cannot act alone; in fact, 
using U.S. combat troops is likely to decrease the 
' 
chance of victory significantly. It is ultimately the 
role of local forces to win their own population. The 
United States should, however, train and ''clean up'' 
client forces so that abuses and corruption do not 
alienate the population from nation-building; and it 
should control and direct the non-military aspects of 
the war. 
6. The United States needs regional strategies to 
deal with regional conflicts. It must deny the enemy 
political and military sanctuary • 1n neighboring 
theatres, while "going to the source" of the regional 
conflict. It cannot allow itself to become bogged down 
in fighting on one subsidiary front while the enemy 
fights on several - an argument shared by analysts of 
conventional warfare. 
't 
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7. The U.S. military establishment must overcome 
its own prejudices against unconventional, ''unmilitary" 
warfare; it must achieve greater coordination among the 
branches of the service as well as with civilian intell-
igence, aid and development agencies. 
a. This kind of warfare must seek to win the 
support of the U.S. population, as well as the foreign 
target population. 25 
Not all of these strategies are accepted by the 
military policymakers and there are still some within 
the military hierarchy who refuse to accept any new 
doctrines regardless of their validity. It is obvious 
from the counterinsurgency strategy outlined above, and 
the defintions of LIC used today, that some lessons were 
learned from Vietnam, and these lessons, as well as a 
more realistic strategy, improve the military•s chances 
in another low-intensity war. 
.. 
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III. CENTRAL AMERICA AND LOW-INTENSITY WARFARE: 
''What 
not be 
Soviet 
A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
we see in Central America today would 
much different if Fidel Castro and the 
Union did not exist. '' 
U.S. Ambassador to Panama Ambler Moss 
A look at history books will show that U.S. 
involvement in Central America is not a new or recent 
phenomenon. From the very inception of the Republic the 
United States has considered the Caribbean region as an 
area in which anything that promoted North American 
security and economic well-being was acceptable, even if 
this infringed upon the rights of the local inhabitants. 
It is a continuation of this policy that the American 
public is currently witnessing under the Reagan 
administration. Although the threat of communist 
insurgencies provides the fuel necessary to ensure 
public support for intervention, the basic aims of the 
administration are no different than the • aims of 
previous presidents as far back as James K Polk in 1845. 
Despite the rhetoric which is sent continually out 
of Washington, the states of Central America have never 
been able to develop completely their own political or 
economic systems without U.S. interference. As a result 
the nations of Central America are not as independent as 
33 
'I H 
President Reagan would have the public believe. In 
order to have a better understanding of problems in the 
region today it is necessary to look first at the 
history of the area and how the groundwork for the 
problems of the 1980's was laid in the preceding 
century. 
From the outset Americans viewed their southern 
neighbors differently than they did Canadians or 
• • Europeans. The Latin American region was seen as an 
area where the United States could expand economically 
and geographically. It was also believed that the 
Central Americans could benefit from and even imitate 
the revolutionary spirit of the U.S. This idea of 
Central American independence, however, was almost 
doomed from the start because of contradictory U.S. 
ideals regarding self-determination, versus North 
American expansion and development. The concept of 
Manifest Destiny had taken root by the early lSOO's, and 
Thomas Jefferson, who added to this policy by • • acquiring 
the Louisiana Territory, saw this doctrine as including 
the Central American region. This belief of Jefferson's 
is evidenced in his statement made in the early part of 
the nineteenth century which asserted that ''America has 
a hemisphere to itself 11 • 26 The question that was not 
asked, or probably not even recognized, 
was:"how is the United states going to deal 
34 
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however, 
with this 
area that is not even a legitimate part of the nation?". 
Although the United States believed that it had the 
hemisphere to itself, this was not actually the case. 
The British were the leading naval power in the world 
and this enabled them to maintain a certain degree of 
economic influence in Central America. Nor did the 
British feel the same pressure of security concerns that 
the U.S. did, and this allowed them to deal with the 
region in a more detached way. By the 1820's, in spite 
of English economic predominance, the United states was 
beginning to assert itself as the protector of the 
region. This more active stance was demonstrated by the 
Monroe Doctrine in 1823 which basically challenged the 
right of European intervention I 1n Latin I America, a 
policy that gave teeth to the Jeffersonian idea of 
having a "hemisphere to itself". 
This view of the United States as the protector of 
Central America was not held only by the North, it was 
reciprocated by the South. Twice, between 1820 and 
1850, three Latin American nations asked to be annexed 
to the United States as protection from Mexico and 
Spain. 27 This action, coupled with continued American 
westward expansion, had served to challenge British 
power in the region and enabled control of the area to 
shift to North America. At the same time there emerged 
in many of the Central American states oligarchs who 
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controlled the power within their countries and who were 
friendly to the United States. This relationship 
between the Central American rulers and the U.S. govern-
ment allowed the United States to develop economic pro-
grams that would benefit both the oligarchs and the 
North Americans, but which neglected the Latin American 
population as a whole. The lack of natural resources in 
the region made agricultural economies necessary, and, 
rather than growing foods that could benefit the local 
inhabitants, the oligarchs focussed on cash crops that 
would increase their own wealth and power. The result of 
this was a structure of inequality which began in the 
mid-lSOO's and continues to this day. ~1 
Not only did the United States support cash-crop 
agricultural programs, it also moved to institute 
programs that would be of direct benefit to the U.S. and 
little benefit to the people of the region. The best 
example of this was the Panama canal. In 1846 a treaty 
was signed with Colombia, which controlled Panama, that 
gave the United States the right to build a cross-isth-
mus canal. The United States would now be able to 
travel much more easily between its East and developing 
West coast. This had little impact on Central America, 
expect for the fact that the United States had further 
solidified its claims in the region and could now exert 
greater political and economic control. The stage was 
.. ,,, . 
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set for almost complete exploitation of Latin America by 
the U.S., although this was defended by both the 
oligarchs and the American government as providing de-
fense and economic development for the region. 
By the late-1800's U.S. companies had invested 
heavily in Central American cash crops, primarily coffee 
and bananas. Not only did this bring increased profits 
for the ruling powers, it also committed the U.S. to a 
more active role in assuring the stability of Latin 
I America. This role put the United States in the 
position of being anti-revolutionary, thus limiting the 
opportunity for removing the oligarchs and installing 
more democratic forms of government. This policy became 
the keystone of U.S. involvement in Central America, and 
resulted in fomenting the very kind of revolution it was 
trying to avoid. Because the Latin American nations did ; ·-
not have strong democratic traditions revolution 
provided their only viable means for change. As Walter 
La Feber suggests: 
Revolutions have served the functions of 
elections in the United States, that is they 
have become virtually the only method of 
transfe2aing power and bringing about needed 
change. 
This refusal to support revolutions forced the 
United States to support governments which were the 
antitheses of American ideals, but the economic benefits 
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of U.S. involvement in Central America outweighed this 
concern. By 1900 the U.S. could lay undisputed claim to 
Central America as an American sphere. This led to the 
belief that U.S. intervention was justifiable in 
maintaining the status quo and provided America's own 
brand of stability to the region. In order to ensure 
this stability, the U.S. had no compunction about using 
military force. This occurred through both the 
occupation of several Central American states by the 
U.S. military as well as the use of u.s.-trained Latin 
American troops. Both Honduras and Nicaragua were occ-
upied by U.S. troops in the early 1900's, the latter for 
a period of twenty years. There was little resistance 
from either the Central American leaders or the North 
American public regarding these acts, they were simply 
seen as "the way things were". In fact, the number of 
times that the United States used military force in the 
region, between 1900 and 1961, is shown below: 
1898-02 
1901 
1905 
1906-09 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1912 
1912 
1912 
1912-25 
1914-34 
1916-24 
U.S. troops occupy Cuba 
U.S. acquires Puerto Rico 
U.S. Marines land at Puerto Cortes, 
Honduras 
U.S. troops occupy Cuba 
U.S. troops sent to Panama 
·U.S.-backed overthrow of Zelaya in 
• Nicaragua 
U.S. troops land in Honduras 
U.S. troops sent to Panama 
U.S. troops occupy Cuba 
U.S. troops briefly occupy Puerto 
Cortes, Honduras 
U.S. Marines occupy Nicaragua 
U.S. Marines occupy Haiti 
U.S. Marines occupy Dominican 
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1917-23 
1918 
1919 
1924 
1926-33 
1932 
1954 
1961 
' 
Republic 
U.S. Marines occupy Cuba 
U.S. troops sent to Panama 
U.S. Marines occupy Honduras' ports 
U.S. Marines land in Honduras 
U.S. Marines occupy Nicaragua and set 
up National Guard under Somoza; 
Sandino defeated, assassinated 
U.S. warships stand by during El 
Salvador matanza 
CIA-backed invasion of Guatemala 
Abortive CIA-backed2 ~ay of Pigs in-
vasion of Cuba 
By the early 1930's, however, the Roosevel
t 
•J 
administration decided to ''clean up" U. s. involvem
ent in 
the region and this led to his expansion of th
e Good 
Neighbor Policy which had originated during the 
Hoover 
presidency. One of the first actions taken by Ro
osevelt 
was the withdrawal of the Marines from Nica
ragua. 
Throughout the rest of the decade the U.S. purs
ued a 
more diplomatic tack in Central America, meetin
g with 
representatives from the region and agreeing to gi
ve up 
the principle of military intervention in Latin A
merica. 
This was not a great sacrifice for Washington, h
owever, 
because: 
North American influence over the Central 
Americans was so strong that it could achieve 
political objectives by exerting only30its 
enormous political and economic leverage. 
In reality then, the Good Neighbor Policy cost the 
United States nothing, while it provided great politi
cal 
I 
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benefits. Central American states saw the policy as 
giving ~ them more recognition, and the United States was 
seen as a benevolent protector for less-developed 
nations. In fact, the policy provided for more active 
involvement on the part of Washington, as the government 
replaced private bankers as the source of funds for de-
velopment projects. Also the military was no longer 
required, because of increased coordination between U.S. 
and Latin American officers. The Good Neighbor Policy 
was not a withdrawal from previous U.S. actions, but, 
rather, a shift from overt intervention to subtle 
political and economic pressure as a way to guarantee 
both U.S. investments and security in the region. 
This policy of non-intervention, but political and 
economic interest, continued for the next twenty-five 
years, until the • Marines were • again deployed • in 
Guatemala, partly to stop President Jacobo Arbenz from 
nationalizing the United Fruit Company's holdings, but 
more so because the U.S. feared that Arbenz was coming 
under communist influence. This had become • a maJor 
concern for the U.S. regarding Central America as the 
Cold War intensified. President Eisenhower was 
concerned about communist incursions in the Caribbean 
Basin, especially after the fall of Cuba to Castro. The 
Cuban revolution had firmly seated a communist 
government in the Western Hemisphere, and Eisenhower, 
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along with those who succeeded him, worked to ensure 
that the ''domino theory'' would not become a reality in 
Central America. • 
Accepting the basic line of the Eisenhower 
I 
administration, President Kennedy believed that active 
American economic aid would bolster support for the U.S. 
in the region, as well as providing a defense against 
political unrest and communist insurgency. It was from 
this policy that the Alliance for Progress (AFP) 
emerged. The AFP sought to encourage stability through 
a stable middle element in the Latin American nations. 
It was believed that massive aid would serve to support 
the middle element while causing the far left and right 
to lose popular backing. This policy, however, 
neglected the root of the problems in Central America 
and, rather than initiating reforms such as land 
redistribution and greater political freedoms which 
would benefit the peasants in the I region, the AFP 
largely ignored these and worked around the basic causes 
of unrest instead of trying to solve them. In 
initiating the Alliance for Progress President Kennedy 
had said: "Let us again transform the (hemisphere) into 
a vast crucible of revolutionary ideas and efforts1131 • 
Within ten years these revolutions did occur, but they 
were not the stabilizing kind hoped for by the Alliance. 
Following Kennedy's and then Johnson's policy of 
I 
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the Alliance, President Nixon came to office with 
Central America in a relatively calm state. This 
situation was agreeable to Nixon as he saw Latin America 
as unimportant as well as untrustworthy. From the out-
set the president's interests were in other areas of the 
world: Vietnam, the Soviet Union and China. Nixon 
believed that these areas would provide not only the op-
portunities for peace, but also the opportunity to 
establish himself as a great statesman. As a result, 
Nixon viewed Latin America as useless in advancing his 
own personal goals or the goals of his administration. 
This view was reflected by Nixon's closest advisor, 
Henry • • Kissinger, • in response 
defense 
to the Chilean Foreign 
Minister's speech 
interests: 
• 1n of Latin American 
"Mr. Minister, you made a strange speech. You 
come here speaking of Latin America, but this 
is not important. Nothing important can come 
from the South. History has never been 
produced in the South. The axis of history 
starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over 
to Washington, and then goes to Tokyo. What 
happens in the South is o;2 no importance. 
You're wasting your time •.• " 
This lack of interest, perhaps even in gaining 
knowledge, by the Nixon administration fitted in 
perfectly with the president's policy of protecting U.S. 
interests throughout the world. The issuing of the 
Nixon Doctrine provided for alternatives to the use of 
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American troops to protect its client states. These 
states would, instead, have to provide their own 
security, with U.S. assistance and training. In Central 
America this further strengthened the already strong 
military leaders and provided for the continued 
exploitation of the peasants by the ruling powers. This 
was especially true in Nicaragua, where Nixon had a very 
I 
close and friendly relationship with the Somoza regime. 
The • economic • • crisis of the mid-1970 1 s ended this 
''peaceful'' era however and led to revolutions which 
sought political restructuring and removal of American 
influence. It was this situation which Jimmy Carter 
inherited upon his election to the presidency. 
The basis of Carter's policy for Central America 
consisted of two things: stability, in fact almost a 
return to the policies of the 1950s, and human rights, 
which was to become a central feature of the carter 
administration. However neither of these two approaches 
was to be very successful in Central America. From the 
outset the Latin American nations did not want to return 
to policies that had not benefitted them in the past • 
The desire to • improve their political and • economic 
conditions fueled the desire for revolutionary change. 
)· 
The human rights agenda also provided little hope for 
active change within the region. Unfortunately, the 
policy, which was designed to improve abuses, was 
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ineffective because it limited aid to states which were 
seen as human rights violators. It must be realized 
that carter's policies were well-intentioned and that he 
sought more equitable forms of government for the 
region. His desire to raise Central America to a more 
equal status with the U.S. is evidenced by his signing 
of the Panama Canal Treaty which relinquished • American 
control of the canal to Panama. At the same time, 
however, the Carter administration had to deal with a 
revolution in Nicaragua. The extremes of the Somoza 
regime had finally come to a head and forced a civil war 
between the Sandinist Front (FSLN) and the Somoza 
government. Carter's human rights stand put him in a 
difficult position because, although Somoza was guilty 
of gross human rights abuses, the FSLN had communist 
backing. The eventual victory of the Sandinistas forced 
the U.S. to go along with a government that they did not 
like. The close alliance between the Sandinistas and 
Castro made the relationship even more difficult, and 
set the stage for the ''dirty little war" that emerged 
under the Reagan administration. 
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IV. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION and CENTRAL AMERICA 
From the outset, the Reagan administration 
committed itself to two wars in Central 1Lmerica, whose 
" 
means were different, but whose ends, the removal of 
communism from the region, were the same. In El Salvador 
the war took the form of counterinsurgency, while • in 
Nicaragua it was an insurgency; the former defending the 
government, while the latter attempted to unseat the 
government. The fierce anti-communism of the president 
was reflected in his determination to pursue both of 
these actions until Central America was "free for 
democracy'' • As in the past, the welfare of the United 
States came before that of the people of the area, and 
the president was most concerned with the security of 
the U.S. 
In order for the administration to gain public 
support for its policies it was necessary to ' give the 
impression that these policies benefitted both the 
United States and the nations of Central America. With 
this in mind, President Reagan formed the National 
Bipartisan Commission on Central America, better known 
as the Kissinger Commission, whose job it was to 
investigate American involvement and policies, as well 
as communist incursions, and propose actions that could 
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be taken by the United States. 
Th• Kissinger commission 
Given .the scope of this paper a complete exposition 
of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America 
(NBCCA) is not possible. However, because of its impact 
on administration policy in the region, a brief 
explanation is helpful inivUnderstanding what the current 
administration views its role in Central America to be. 
The commission ~as chaired by Dr. Henry Kissinger and 
included both Democrats and Republicans, private 
citizens and business leaders. It was formed in July, 
1983 by the President to: 
... advise on a long-term United States policy 
that will best respond to the challenges of 
social, economic, and democratic development 
in the region and to internal and 3Jternal 
threats to its security and stability. 
The Commission provided the President and Congress 
with an overview of the region, the problems that both 
Central • America and the U.S. face, and possible 
solutions to those problems. From the outset the NBCCA 
was harshly critical of Soviet-Cuban intervention in the 
area and saw this adventurism as the primary cause of 
unrest and revolutionary sentiment. As the 
I I Comm1ss1on 
stated, "Cuba and Nicaragua did not invent the the 
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grievances that made insusrrection possible in El 
Salvador and elsewhere" but it believed that the 
communist governments of these states were 
benefactors of the abysmal conditions. 34 
the • primary 
In fact, there 
was a refusal by the Commission to recognize the role 
that the U.S. played in bringing about the inequitable 
system in Latin America; a system that the NBCCA felt 
would benefit from more 
and politics • economies 
u. s. 
of the 
involvement I 1n the 
• region. The Central 
American Report, published in Guatemala, saw this call 
for increased involvement as ''irritating paternalism" 
which could ''only increase neodependency [and] even more 
U.S. control of internal affairs than now exists, and 
which is already a source of resentment • in many 
sectors. 1135 
The role that the NBCCA played in the Reagan 
administration's implementation of foreign policy for 
Central America was that of bipartisanship. The 
President believed that the Commission would provide a 
consensus for his goals in the region and would also 
increase support for the war against Nicaragua. The 
Commission did criticize Nicaragua, which it saw as the 
''base of subversion ..• that can affect the entire 
region. 1136 It was stated by the Commission that this 
was, in fact, already being done with Sandinista support 
of the guerrillas in El Salvador. In addition, the 
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Commiaaion also asked that human rights violations be 
stopped, but they did not make increased aid dependent 
upon this; interestingly, El Salvador, which was named 
as one of the worst offenders of human rights, was 
recommended as the greatest recipient for military aid. 
The NBCCA also stressed the need to improve ''human 
development--particularly in health and education" as 
well as short-term and longer-term measures to alleviate 
the ''economic • • crisis in the • region [as] a means of 
ensuring that economic, political and social development 
37 go forward together." To achieve the goals set forth 
in their report, the Commission recommended an immediate 
supplemental appropriation of $400_ million and an 
additional $8 billion in economic aid for the succeeding 
5 years. The Commission also recommended increased 
military assistance to permit the application of modern, 
humane counterinsurgency strategies. 38 In essence then, 
the NBCCA concluded that the Central America states did 
pose a security risk and that the U.S. needed to assert 
itself in the region because: 
Beyond the issue of U.S. security interests in 
the Central American-Caribbean region, our 
credibility worldwide is engaged. The triumph 
of hostile forces in what the Soviets call the 
''strategic rear'' of the United st,;es would be 
read as a sign of U.S. impotence. 
Thus, the policy for U.S. intervention in Central 
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America was given credibility by the Kissinger 
Commission, as was the President's desire to make 
America a "force to be reckoned with'' once again. As a 
result, the war against Nicaragua continued, despite its 
lack of public support, and the administration continued 
to push its Central American policy in spite of its lack 
of direction or cohesion. The NBCCA had enabled the 
executive to remain in command of a situation it really 
had no control over, and low-intensity warfare was the 
means by which the administration's policies would be 
carried out. 
The Reagan Doctrine and Central America 
The Reagan Doctrine has never
1 
been clearly defined 
but its essence has been embodied in speeches by the 
President and senior administrat·ion officials. The 
doctrine is basically anti-communist and asserts that 
the U.S. will back any forces that are fighting 
communism, while also assisting in trying to build 
democracy in the Third World. However, as Christopher 
Layne writes in The Wall Street Journal, the doctrine is 
much more than that: 
It aims to cause the Soviet empire's breakup 
and, ultimately, the collapse of the Soviet 
state itself by resisting Soviet 40and Soviet-supported aggression everywhere ••. 
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In this light Central America plays a pivotal role in 
the view of the administration. If a concerted effort 
is not made to stop Nicaragua's (in the administration's 
view, Moscow's) export of communism then the soviets 
will have bases in Central America from which they can 
challenge the U.S. Thus, Latin America is seen as the 
testing ground for implementing the Reagan Doctrine. 
The primary question regarding the implementation 
of this doctrine is that of security interests. The 
doctrine suggests that it will be the responsibility of 
the United States to fight against communism everywhere 
but is it necessary to do so, and is this in America's 
best interest? The result of this kind of thinking is 
that it places the U.S. in an "us against them" 
situation, with the implied result that the U.S. will be 
left as the only nation that could combat communism. 
This view is dangerous for the United States because it 
limits foreign policy by making every area in the world 
a strategic concern. Although the Reagan Doctrine fits 
in well with the President's view of the world and the 
usefulness of low-intensity warfare, it does not make 
for a sound, farsighted foreign policy. 
The Reagan Doctrine has already made a significant 
impact on U.S. foreign policy, however. Because the 
President sees Central America, especially Nicaragua, as 
a Soviet challenge to democracy, he has made American 
... 
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commitment to the region a primary policy and has gone 
to great lengths to try and rally support for his cause. 
The continuing battle for aid to the Contras, the anti-
Sandinista guerrilla group, is evidence of Mr. Reagan's 
desire to continue the low-intensity war in spite of the 
lack of public and Congressional support. In addition, 
as Mr. Layne points out, and contrary to the President's 
rhetoric: 
[T]he Reagan Doctrine runs counter to 
Americans' desire for peace, their wise and 
instinctive aversion to overseas adventures, 
and - most painfully and paradoxically for the 
doctrine's architects - 41to their most 
cherished democratic values. 
Although the Doctrine has provided a motive for the ad-
ministration to become more deeply involved in Central 
America, this policy has not been supported by the Amer-
ican people. For the President, the Reagan Doctrine up-
holds his belief that a communist government • 1s an 
inherent threat to U.S. security, and any means for 
removing this threat are justified. Unfortunately for 
Mr. Reagan, the majority do not share his view. 
Nicaragua and Low-Intensity warfare 
\· 
' 
From the beginning of his pre~idency Ronald Reagan 
viewed Nicaragua as the source of unrest throughout Cen-
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tral America. As he stated in his speech to a joint 
session of Congress on April 27, 1983: "Violence has 
been Nicaragua's most important export to the world ... it 
is helping Cuba and the Soviets to destabilize our 
hemisphere. 1142 As shown above, Nicaragua has been at 
the center of U.S. involvemeut in the 
.. 
• region for the 
last 75 years. For the past eight years, however, 
American hostility towards this small, underdeveloped 
nation has been given an air of legitimacy because the 
government is Socialist and is portrayed as a threat to 
U.S. security, as well as to the security of the 
surrounding states. How great a risk does the 
Sandinista government represent, and what steps has the 
Reagan administration taken "so that the people of 
Central • America can hold the line against externally 
supported aggression? 1143 
In trying to contain Nicaragua the administration 
believed that it had three options: the deployment of 
U.S. troops to overthrow the Sandinistas, direct negoti-
ation with the Sandinistas, or support of an indigenous 
insurgency group whose goal was to take control of the 
country. The first two options were unacceptable for 
different reasons. The administration realized that the 
American public would not permit the use of U.S. troops, 
regardless of how dim a picture the President presented. 
This refusal to commit American forces to fight wars in 
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the Third World has become known as the "Vietnam 
syndrome'' and is attributable to the lack of u. s. 
success in Southeast Asia. The President also would not 
consider direct negotiations because he believed that 
the Sandinistas were not the legitimate governing body 
and that they did not represent the majority of 
Nicaraguans. As a result the administration was left 
with the third alternative, supporting the Contras. 
Until July of 1979 Nicaragua was ruled by Anastasio 
Somoza, who had maintained power for 45 years. The 
Somoza government, although supported by the United 
States, was corrupt and autocratic1 and Somoza's National 
Guard was particularly well-known for its ruthless 
treatment of dissenters. Unlike other Central American 
states, the power in Nicaragua rested completely in the 
hands of the Somoza family rather than in a larger 
elite. The result of this was increased vulnerability 
to revolution, as well as a loss of U.S. respectability 
internationally. As the NBCCA points out: 
The precise degree of U.S. responsibility for 
the imposition and long survival of the Somoza 
regime is a matter of dispute. But that many Central Americans, especially Nicaraguans, have associated the dictatorship with U.S. in-
tervention and subsequent U.S. support is 
clear. This perception is an impor~int under-lying factor in the current crisis. 
By the late-1970's however, the tide was turning 
53 
.... 
against Somoza, and he was finally removed from power in 
July, 1979. Although there had been, coalition of 
revolutionaries fighting the regime, in the end the 
primary force in the opposition was the Sandinista Nat-
ional Liberation Front (FSLN). The FSLN allied itself 
with the Broad Opposition Front (FAO) which was a 
moderate group of businesspeople and professionals who 
advocated democratic reform. The FSLN, however, were 
Marxist and had strong outside backing from Cuba. As 
the FSLN became the center of the anti-Somozaists the 
U.S. was caught in a dilemma. Although they no longer 
supported Somoza (all military aid was cut off in 
January, 1979), they were also not ready to accept a 
Marxist government in Central America. With the victory 
of the Sandinistas however the U.S. was forced to admit 
the defeat of Somoza as well as the fact that no 
acceptable moderate force could be found to challenge 
the Sandinistas. As Walter LaFeber says: "The United 
States now had to live with a revolutionary government 
it had fought to the ena. 1145 Ronald Reagan was not 
prepared to live with the Sandinistas however, and his 
' 
extension of the low-intensity war against them bore 
this out. 
In the early 1980 1 s the administration moved to 
give greater support to the Contras. In this early 
stage of the "war'' the training and development of the 
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Contras was controlled by the CIA. Under William Casey 
the CIA had not only improved its intelligence-gathering 
capabilities but had also developed a small army which 
specialized in guerrilla warfare. This enabled the CIA 
to take an active role in prosecuting the low-intensity 
war in both El Salvador and Nicaragua. Because the CIA 
was under the direction of the White House, the 
administration could continue to put pressure on the 
Sandinistas militarily with virtually no public or 
Congressional knowledge or interference. This policy 
worked well for the administration until two events 
brought the covert action into public view: the 
discovery of an "assassination manual" to be used by 
u.s.-supported guerrillas, and the mining of Nicaraguan 
harbors in September, 1983. Both of these actions 
served to involve more actively the United States 
Congress in Central American policy-making. At the same 
time, although the use of the CIA was limited after 
1983, the door was opened for the President to wage his 
Central American war more publicly. 
In order for President Reagan to gain support for 
his policies in Central America and, more importantly, 
for the Contras, he relied on rhetoric. In speaking 
about the Contras he referred to them as the "moral 
equivalent of our founding fathers'' and as "freedom 
fighters". Mr. Reagan believed that U.S. security could 
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only be assured by the removal of communism in Central 
America, although he stated that "We do not seek 
[Nicaragua's] overthrow11 • 46 The President did believe, 
however, that an indigenous revolution, with outside 
support, would be able to bring about effective change 
within Nicaragua, and he saw the Contras as the basis 
for that revolution. At the same time, the 
administration realized that the contra effort would not 
be sufficient to bring about the fall of the 
Sandinistas. The President seemed to favor a military 
struggle, but his advisors began to see that the u.s. 
would be better served by a long-term political 
struggle. Thus, the United States involvement in a 
low-intensity war took on a new shape, one which they 
hoped would force the Sandinistas either out of power or 
at least into dramatic change. 
The opening of the wider war against Nicaragua was 
begun with the Big Pine II military maneuvers in Central 
America in November, 1983. Only one month earlier, the 
United States had invaded Grenada to stop the 
establishment of a communist government there. This 
action, along with the massive military buildup for the 
Big Pine operation, led Daniel Ortega, the Sandinista 
:, :I! 
leader to believe that the United·/' States was preparing 
' 
to invade Nicaragua. This was not' the case, however, 
as Sara Miles points out: ''The maneuvers were not a 
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preparation or cover for the war: they were the 
embodiment of the war 11 • 41 The low-intensity policy of 
the Reagan administration had been successful in setting 
the stage for Washington to achieve its three main goals 
in Nicaragua, with the ultimate aim being the loss of 
Sandinista power. 
The three goals that Washington had set were in 
three areas: the economy, the military, and politics. By 
controlling these areas the administration believed that 
the U.S. would be able to win the low-intensity war and 
dictate policy in Nicaragua. The goals were defined as 
such: 
In the economic sphere, they would force 
Nicaragua to devote half its budget to 
defense; in the military they would compel the 
Sandinistas to engage in a conventional build-
up of their armed forces; and in the 
political, they would lock Nicaragua into a 
regional diij~omatic framework controlled by 
Washington. 
The Sandinistas refused to allow the United States 
to manipulate them, however. Rather than proceeding • in 
the way that Washington had hoped, the I Nicaraguan 
government instead launched their own low-intensity cam-
paign aimed at winning the "hearts and minds'' of the 
population, while at the same time decreasing the base 
of support for the Contras. Although the administration 
had never expected the Contras to overthrow the govern-
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ment, it was hoped that they could at least apply enough 
pressure to force the sandinistas to negotiate. Even 
this became increasingly difficult, however, as Congress 
took an increased interest in the President's waging of 
the war in Nicaragua. 
The involvement of the Congress served to question 
the funding that the Contras were I I receiving from the 
U.S. As a result, aid to the "freedom fighters" became 
an increasingly partisan issue, with Congress refusing 
any aid early • 1n 1984 and then reversing itself and 
allowing $27 million in nonmilitary aid later in the 
year. The controversy over aid, especially military, 
continued both in Congress and within the administration 
despite the Boland Amendment which had been passed by 
Congress in December, 1982. This amendment barred the 
CIA and Defense Department from "spending funds toward 
overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua or provoking a 
military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras 11 • 49 
Since 1982 the administration, with a certain degree of 
Congressional complicity, had been illegally funding the 
Contra effort in spite of the fact that there was no 
significant progress being made. By early 1987 the war 
was a virtual stalemate with the Sandinistas still • 1n 
power and maintaining tne upperhand in the conflict. For 
all intents and purposes the Reagan administration's 
low-intensity war in Nicaragua was without success. 
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V. PROBLEMS OF LOW-INTENSITY WARFARE 
The chapters above have dealt primarily with the 
definitions, use and application of low-intensity 
warfare. This chapter will analyze how effective LIW 
has been in furthering America's foreign policy goals, 
and whether its continued use is in the United States' 
best interest. Following the Vietnam war LIW was seen 
as the most effective means for U.S. intervention in the 
Third World, especially • in confronting communist 
• • incursions. Since 1980 the Reagan administration has 
placed great emphasis on the use of LIW, making it the 
centerpiece of protection for U.S. security interests. 
What the President has not taken into account, however, 
is the lack of success the United States has had in 
applying the low-intensity lessons learned from Vietnam. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there ha 
not been a clear definition of what America's strategic 
interests really are, leaving the U.S. vulnerable to 
overcommitment of its forces and with no consensus as to 
where the U.S. should really take action to defend its 
security. The current policy does not appear to be • in 
the best interest of the United states, with LIW being 
applied randomly and with little effectiveness. 
Another problem raised with the use of 
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low-intensity warfare is that of secrecy. The United 
States has a tradition of being an open society. 
Although policy is not decided by national referendum 
elected officials are supposed to represent the best 
interests of the American people. This process is 
dependent on the free exchange of ideas, as well as 
honesty and openness between the executive and 
legislative branches of government and the public. This 
policy is at odds, however, with the present use of LIW. 
In Central America the administration has depended upon 
secrecy and covert action in its prosecuting of the war. 
The executive branch has attempted to circumvent laws 
established by Congress, specifically the Boland 
Amendment, in order to continue fighting a war which was 
neither authorized or supported by the American public. 
These actions do not reflect either the I American 
tradition or American ideals. Such policies are 
certainly not beneficial to the continued success of the 
American system, and for this reason the continued use 
of LIW needs to be questioned as an aspect of U.S. 
foreign policy. 
Learning From Vietnam 
" 
As outlined above, there were a number of basic 
arguments regarding LIC which emerged from the Vietnam 
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war. Have the U.S. political and military leaders 
learned from this • experience and adhered to the 
strategies which resulted from the failure of the U.S. 
to fight a successful low-intensity war in Vietnam? In 
Central America the answer appears to be 
Reagan administration has continued to 
"no". (;he 
push the 
low-intensity war in the region without using America's 
previous experience as a guide. The result has bee~ a 
failure of both the means and ends in the application of 
LIW, especially in Nicaragua. 
From the beginning of the Reagan administration's 
involvement in Nicaragua there was a failure to take the 
indigenous culture and history into account. Because 
successful operations need solid intelligence about 
local conditions, political as well as economic, the war 
was disadvantaged from the start. President Reagan 
blamed the problems in the region on communist interven-
tion, but this was not the root of the revolution. The 
refusal to understand the role that America, through its 
economic exploitation, had played in creating the crisis 
allowed Washington to pursue its own goals without 
' 
addressing the actual causes. 
Secondly, the administration has not offered an 
alternative for Nicaragua except the rhetoric about 
providing democracy for the region. There has been no 
substantive discussion on what would be most beneficial 
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to the Nicaraguan people if the Sandinistas are 
overthrown. It was realized after Vietnam that a 
successful low-intensity war would have to include 
nation-building, the construction of an acceptable 
alternative social system, as one of its objectives. As 
the war continues however it has become increasingly 
obvious that no Contra-related group would provide an 
adequate internal defense against continued insurgency. 
The administration seems content to return to the old 
system as long as the threat of • communism • is removed 
from the region. This option would continue the policy 
of nee- dependency and offers no opportunity for 
• Nicaragua to establish its own identity. For 
Washington, nation-building has taken a back seat to 
what it considers more important U.S. security concerns. 
Thirdly, in direct disregard for the Vietnam exper-
ience, the United States has acted alone in Central 
America, even without the benefit of public consensus. 
It was argued after Vietnam that it is ultimately the 
role of local forces to win their own population and, to 
this point, the Contras have been unable to do so. In 
fact, rather than gaining the support of the local 
population the Contras have alienated many • Nicaraguans 
because of their indiscriminate use of violence. As 
Sara Miles observes: 
'\ 
' ' 
' 
••• the Contras have not been able to establish 
I ' ' 
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solid political structures of their own inside Nicaragua: so far, they have found it easier to destroy than to build. It is still rare to hear Nicaraguan peasants say that an attack killed "Sandinistas." Most will say - 50 and feel - that "the Contras are killing us." 
The United States has tried unsuccessfully to 
control both the military and non-military aspects of 
the war. U.S. advisors have trained the Contras, but 
they have been unable to end the corruption or 
infighting that exist within the Contra organization. 
The implications of this failure to make the Contras an 
effective threat for the Sandinistas have become 
increasingly apparent. Because the Contras have not 
been able to win either territory or the support of the 
people the Reagan administration's low-intensity war 
cannot be won by local forces, even with U.S. support. 
Finally, the United States has not developed a 
regional strategy to deal with what is a regional 
conflict. As stated above, the administration • 1S 
obsessed with keeping communism out of Central America 
and views any insurgency as a threat. For this reason 
the president has seen low-intensity warfare as the pro-
teeter of American security interests. What the 
administration has not realized, however, is that the 
United States 
counterinsurgency 
cannot 
actions 
become 
everywhere 
involved 
and, 
in 
· more 
importantly, there needs to be an assessment of what the 
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United States security interests really are. The blind 
application of LIW to meet any perceived threat is 
neither practical or neccessary. For the effective use 
of LIW the U.S. needs to plan what it wants to 
accomplish and how low-intensity war will be used to 
meet the legitimate needs of • America. This lack of 
planning was evident in Vietnam, and it is evident today 
in Central America. 
security concerns and Low-Intensity warfare 
Perhaps the greatest foreign policy danger facing 
the United States today • 1S the lack of consensus 
regarding American security interests. Nowhere is this 
more important, or neccessary, than in the application 
of of a low-intensity strategy. The primary issue in 
the 1980 1 s is whether the Sandinista government poses a 
threat to U.S. security and, if it does, how it should 
be dealt with. 
The basic announced problem for the United States 
in Central • America • 1S the existence of a communist 
government. It is solely for this reason that the 
Reagan administration has been so adamant in its fight 
to retain funding for the Contras, as well as the 
President's contention that U.S. security is 
jeopardized. What the situation amounts to is the 
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unwillingness of the Reagan administration to coexist 
with a communist government in America's ''backyard''. The 
real question then is whether the American government 
' 
can live with the Sandinista regime and it appears that 
Washington's answer is.no. Despite statements to the 
contrary the President has spoken of making the 
Sandinistas say "uncle" and also that he would like to 
"remove the present system". Secretary of State George 
Shultz concurred by saying: 
Can we ... accept 
araguan] regime 
find its ideology 
it simply because 
is we must oppose 
simply because 
because they are 
interests of the 
client, ang1 who hemisphere. 
1. the existence of "ttPe [Nic-
in our hemisphere ~Ven if we 
abhorrent? Must we oppose 
it is Communist? The answer 
the Nicaraguan dictators not 
they are Communists, but 
Communists who serve the 
Soviet Union and its Cuban 
threaten peace in this 
This is the basis for American intervention in Central 
America. The administration fears that Soviet-backed 
revolutions will develop throughout the region, giving 
the Soviets bases, as Secretary Shultz says, ''in our 
immediate neighborhood". 
What are the United States security interests in 
Central America then? Gregory Treverton in an article 
!, 
for Survival asserts that 
The United 
qualifies as 
America .•• in 
States really has nothing that 
a security interest in Central 
military terms the U.S. will re-
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main so preponderant in the region as to deter 
any possible military threat. What happens in Central America is therefore, 52in security terms, a matter of indifference. 
• 
The • primary concern for the United States in the 
region has to be the establishment of Soviet or Cuban 
bases. Whether a particular government is ''Right'' or 
"Left" is not really important as long as they do not 
provide the Soviets with opportunities at the expense of 
the United States. In addition, the domino effect which 
the Reagan administration is so concerned about seems 
highly unlikely. The Sandinistas have been in power for 
eight years and no other Central American nation has 
fallen to communism. In the end it appears that the 
answer to Secretary Shultz 's question has to be ''yes, 
the United States has to be prepared to live with the 
Sandinistas in some circumstances", for several reasons. 
First, the American people are not willing to pay the 
price neccessary to overthrow the Sandinista government 
even though they would prefer to see them out of power. 
Second, the administration's low-intensity efforts 
against Nicaragua have been unsuccessful. Third, the 
Sandinistas do not pose a security threat for the United 
States. Although the administration claims that 
Nicaragua is exporting revolution and providing bases 
for the Soviets, this has not been acceptably verified. 
As Treverton states: 
1;" 
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••• U.S. policy [needs to] seperate what Am-
ericans find distasteful from what they are 
determined to prevent - actions by Nicaragua 
that would pose threats to U.S. and regional 
security. It would make [this] line crystal -
clear to Nicaragua, and it would leave the 
governmnent in Managua under no illusions 
about wha53 would happen if Nicaragua crossed 
that line. 
covert Action 
The least publicized aspect of low-intensity 
warfare is probably the most widely used: covert action. 
In using covert action the government does not have to 
explain itself or leave itself open to questioning or 
criticism. It also can enable an administration to 
pursue an objective that is not widely supported by the 
public, as evidenced in Central America. Covert action 
however does not fit in well with the United States' 
political system, making it a difficult policy to apply 
for LIW. It is this aspect of low-intensity warfare 
that is the most suspect and which calls to question the 
actual benefits of a LIW strategy. ·} 
Although covert action can be (and perhaps at times 
should be) a part of U.S. foreign policy, this is only 
possible with the consent or, at least, the knowledge of 
Congress. Without this, the balance of power between 
branches is threatened as is the integrity of the 
executive office. This problem has 
. I 
occurred several 
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times in connection with the war against Nicaragua, the 
most notable examples being the mining of the Nicaraguan 
• harbors and the recent revelation of the Iran - Contra 
affair. Both of these actions were carried out 
covertly, and yet neither accomplished anything except 
the embarrassment of the United States. In fact, as 
Gregory Treverton points out: 
Not only has [Contra] support become something of a farce (the least 'covert' covert action in history), it has also achieved the worst of both worlds. The Contras have posed a scant threat of overthrow to the Sandinistas ... while U.S. support for the Contras has tarnished the U.S. reputation internationally and justified-in the eyes of most Latin Americans and much of the rest of the world - almost any relationship with Cuba and the Soviet Union 
~hat sihe Sandinistas may choose to enter into. 
Not only does the reputation of the United States 
suffer as a result of incompetent covert action, but the 
office of the president suffers as well, especially when 
the President shows complicity with the action. In both 
the mining of the harbors and the Iran - Contra affair, 
although Mr. Reagan may have not been directly involved, 
he also did not condemn the acts, instead offering his 
support for what had been done. These reactions served 
to diminish the repectability of the President because 
they were illegal acts, done without a declaration of 
I war and in direct disregard for laws passed by Congress. 
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In these instances covert action served neither the 
country nor the President. For ~ successful covert 
policy the President needs to work, with rather than 
against, the Congress. The ends cannot justify the 
means, no matter how well-intentioned they are. The 
Iran - Contra affair is evidence of this • 
. ,
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' CONCLUSION 
The chapters above have dealt with the definitions 
and applications of low-intensity warfare, but they have 
not answered the primary question: should the United 
States develop and implement a low-intensity strategy? 
Given the experiences and current application of LIW the 
answer would appear to be "no''. The administration has 
not set the doctrine into any sort of strategic 
framework and, without this, a low-intensity policy will 
prove to be unsuccessful, if not counterproductive, for 
the United States. A successful low-intensity strategy 
could be fashioned though if there was acceptance by the 
military establishment, refusal to use covert action, 
and agreement within the government and military as to 
America's strategic interests and goals . 
• consensus in these areas, however, a 
low-intensity policy is not possible. 
Without 
workable 
First the United States military establishment has 
to come to terms with the concept of low-intensity 
warfare. Following the Vietnam war a low-intensity 
school for military planning emerged. The U.S. had been 
unsuccessful in Southeast Asia because it had not 
understood the nature of a low-intensity conflict and 
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some within the Pentagon realized that a future lack of 
preparation might leave the U.S. even more vulnerable. 
This view has not garnered widespread support within the 
military, however. Because Europe is still seen as the 
primary focus for U.S. forces, most analysts favor con-
ventional force development as opposed to Special 
Operations Forces. For the United States to effectively 
implement a low-intensity strategy this attitude has to 
change. The Joint Chiefs of Staff need to realize that 
America's commitments in the Third World necessitate a 
strategy that will enable the U.S. to fight in these 
areas when necessary. Experiences such as Vietnam 
demonstrate the in- effectiveness of traditional combat 
troops in low-inten- sity situations. Providing a 
strategy which is both militarily acceptable and 
workable is essential if the United States is to 
continue to employ a low-intensity policy in the Third 
World. 
Second, the U.S. cannot combine covert action with 
its low-intensity strategy, even though it may be easy 
to do. As mentioned above, covert action does not work 
well within the constraints of the American political 
system. In order to support the application of a 
low-intensity strategy the Congress, as well as the 
public, need to know what the goals of this strategy 
are, and how they are to be achieved. The covert use of 
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LIW provides neither of these; rather, it provides for 
secrecy and implies an unwillingness to gain public 
approval. 
This type of action has ·received a resurgence of 
popularity during the Reagan administration because its 
Central American policies are not well supported. 
Instead of complying with the wishes of the American 
people, the President has continued to wage a war 
against Nicaragua, and covert action, through the CIA, 
has provided his means for doing so. This has reflected 
badly on the President as policies such as the mining of 
Nicaraguan harbors and the Iran - Contra affair have 
been exposed. Because the administration believed that 
it could achieve its goals in Central America through 
the use of covert action, it went so far as to disregard 
laws passed by Congress which prohibited aid to the 
Contras. Rather than strengthening public support for 
the low-intensity war in Central America, covert action 
has served to weaken it, calling into question the 
administration's strategy and its application of a 
low-intensity policy. 
Finally the United States needs to establish its 
strategic interests firmly and decide how LIW can be 
used to defend these areas. At present LIW • 1S being 
applied • in a "knee-jerk" fashion out of a fear of 
communism rather than legitimate security threats being 
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the basis for intervention. It has become apparent that 
this is not a beneficial policy for the U.S. to follow, 
as Gregory Treverton has pointed out, saying that such a 
policy tarnishes America's reputation and alienates 
those nations that the u.s is trying to befriend. A 
successful low-intensity policy will seek to function 
within a stategic framework, weighing potential cost 
against gain and responding only if U.S. security • 1S 
being threatened. To paraphrase Robert Kupperman and 
William Taylor, Jr., what is needed is a '7' top-to-bottom 
review of all U.S. low-intensity 
light of well-articulated strategic 
capabilities 
55 goals. 
in the 
It • 1S 
essential for America's security and reputation that 
these goals be the basis for a low-intensity policy. 
America's success at developing and • using LIW • 1S 
contingent upon these three factors. Failure to apply 
any of them will result in a lack of support for low-
intensity policies and the possible vulnerability of 
U.S. strategic interests. There needs to be agreement 
between the government, the military and the public as 
to U.S. foreign policy goals and how LIW will, serve to 
fit the defense needs of the u.s. Until this is done, 
the United States will be unable to develop and 
implement a successful and consistent low-intensity 
doctrine. 
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